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The political economy of hospital rate regulation in Maine
Maine Policy Review (1993). Volume 2, Number 2
Ten years ago, Maine established a health care finance board to regulate hospital rates. But the
concerns that prompt`ed the regulatory system, access and cost, have not abated. In this article,
former Maine Health Care Finance Commission chair David Wihry, and former Commission
staffers Julie Fralich and Ellen Jane Schneiter examine the economic and political influences
that have affected the state’s efforts to regulate hospital costs.
by David F. Wihry, Julie T. Fralich, and Ellen Jane Schneiter
University of Maine and University of Southern Maine
Introduction
In 1983, Maine joined the ranks of a handful of states that chose to regulate hospital rates. On the
tenth anniversary of the Maine Health Care Finance Commission (the "Commission"), we would
like to examine the political and economic forces that have impinged upon the regulatory
process. The concerns about accessibility to health services for low income people and about
escalating health care costs that prompted Maine’s rate control program have not gone away.
Indeed, they have moved health care reform to the forefront of the national policy agenda and
have stimulated a move for broader cost containment and access policies at the state level. The
Clinton Administration’s health care proposals may well place substantial responsibility on the
states to implement and perhaps even to design programs to expand access and to restrain costs.
A review of Maine’s experience with the economic regulation of hospitals may provide clues
about how to enhance the effectiveness of government intervention in this important and difficult
arena. Maine’s experience may be particularly relevant to understanding the opportunities and
the constraints presented by the "global budgeting" and other proposals now under consideration.
The present discussion will address almost exclusively what could be called the "first phase" of
the Commission’s existence. Legislation passed in 1989 in response to recommendations from a
"Blue Ribbon Commission" mandated some major changes that have been implemented only
recently. An assessment of this second phase would be premature.
We begin with an overview of the essential elements of the regulatory system. We then describe
the industry reaction to regulation and the impact of that reaction on the Commission. We go on
to reflect on the balance of political forces that have shaped the Commission’s experience and
end by reflecting on the role of hospital rate regulation and on some specific lessons that might
bear on regulatory effectiveness.
Maine’s system of hospital regulation
Background
Maine’s regulatory system replaced a voluntary budget review program implemented in 1978.
The voluntary program had the support of the hospital industry, which viewed the initiative as an

opportunity to demonstrate that hospitals were capable of effective self-regulation, negating any
need for public control. The program required all hospitals to participate in a budget review
process. However, no hospital was required to live within the approved budget or to abide by the
comments of the Voluntary Budget Review Organization.
The Maine Health Facilities Cost Review Board, an agency that had been set up to monitor the
program, found the voluntary system ineffective and urged, along with the leadership of the
Department of Human Services, that the state establish a mandatory rate review program. The
administration worked with the Joint Committee on Human Resources to guide through the
legislature the statute creating the Maine Health Care Finance Commission and the regulatory
program that it administers. The expressed intent of the legislation was to create a regulatory
system that would appropriately limit the rate of increase in hospital costs, while protecting the
quality and accessibility of hospital services throughout the state by assuring the financial
viability of an efficient and effective hospital system. Objectives expressed in the statute also
included encouraging hospitals to operate efficiently, promoting equity among payers, and
allowing insurers predictability in payment amounts and a voice in the determination of
reasonable hospital costs. The statute contained no explicit performance standards against which
the effectiveness of the regulatory program would be judged. The regulatory system is
administered by an executive director and his/her staff, who report to five part-time
commissioners. The Commissioners are appointed by the governor, with the consent of the
legislature, for staggered four-year terms. The Commission is an independent executive agency
funded by an annual charge added to each hospital’s financial requirements (and, for a number of
years, by an additional state appropriation). The current members of the Commission are:
Rosalyne Bernstein, chair; Elinor W. Goldblatt, vice chair; Harvey Picker; Richard B. Dalbeck;
and Robert A. Strong. The executive director is Robert K. Clarke.
A formula-driven system
The regulatory system attempts to restrain the growth in hospitals’ expenditures by controlling
the growth in their revenues. Prior to each hospital’s fiscal year, the Commission issues an order
assigning the hospital an authorized level of total revenue. The revenue limit is designed to
generate enough net revenue to cover what the system defines as the hospital’s "financial
requirements," the amount it needs to operate during that year. The concept of financial
requirements plays a key role, since the level of each hospital’s expenditures is determined not
by the hospital’s choice but by a system of public choice. This system implements statutory
language through agency rules and decisions that specify what each hospital’s financial
requirements should be.
The system’s enabling legislation made the determination of financial requirements essentially
formula-driven. The starting point for calculating a revenue limit was the hospital’s base-year
financial requirements, which were defined by statute as the expenses the hospital budgeted in its
last fiscal year under the voluntary budget review system. Non-capital financial requirements
were then adjusted annually to reflect changes in factors judged, in effect, to be beyond the
hospital’s control. These adjustments, all defined by rules that interpreted the statute, accounted
for changes in volume of services, case mix, and input prices. The capital component of financial
requirements was defined to include actual principal and interest payments, a downpayment on

replacement for facilities and fixed equipment, and price level depreciation for movable
equipment.
The discretion to make further adjustments in financial requirements was severely constrained by
the statute. The Commission could review cases on an individual basis and could adjust financial
requirements for the impact of unforeseen and uncontrollable events. The Commission was also
given the authority (after the first two years) to establish a state-wide cap on the amount of new
financial requirements that could be approved through the Certificate of Need (CON) program
administered by the Department of Human Services. Financial requirements would be adjusted
for CON-approved expenses as long as their costs did not exceed the state-wide cap (which was
eventually called the Hospital Development Account).
Once the hospital’s financial requirements were determined, a limit on the total amount of
charges the hospital would be allowed to levy was computed. This gross revenue limit included
mark-ups to financial requirements to cover uncompensated care, payor differentials (the
discounts permitted insurers in limited circumstances), and the shortfalls in payments by
Medicare and Medicaid.
The net effect of these adjustments was to hold the hospital responsible for any increases in
expenses that exceeded financial requirements. The hospital was free to implement a rate
structure that would, over the course of the year, generate the approved revenue and would
assure that the hospital’s financial requirements were met. If the hospital spent less than its
financial requirements, it was still allowed to generate its revenue limit and keep the savings. If a
hospital collected more than its revenue limit, it was penalized for overcharging through an
adjustment to a subsequent year’s revenue limit.
To ensure consistency, equity, and enforceability, the rules became both lengthy and detailed.
The rules described with painstaking precision the formulas that would be used to calculate
hospital input price inflation, changes in the volume of services, changes in case mix (among
many other considerations), and the hospital’s revenue limit. The complexity of the rules
reflected the difficult choices required to translate relatively clear-cut concepts into operational
definitions. Some of the issues the Commission had to address included: How are changes in
volume to be estimated prospectively? Should volume projections be revised at year end to
reflect actual changes in volume? What degree of accuracy can be achieved with an input price
index? Should increases in the cost of such items as malpractice insurance be treated as a
component of inflation or as an unforeseen event? How should the costs of new technologies and
drugs be treated? Should these costs be incorporated into financial requirements through one of
the formula adjustments or as unforeseen events? These issues and many others were the focus
of the Commission’s early policy decisions as it shaped its rules and responded to the many
appeals that were filed by hospitals.
The principal alternative to the formula approach would have been budget review. Budget review
would entail a periodic, or at the very least an initial, examination of a hospital’s historic or
proposed expenditures for "reasonableness." The designers of Maine’s program rejected the
budget review concept on several grounds, primarily because of the difficulty of defining either
in principle or in practice what constitutes "reasonable" financial requirements. Hospitals would

always have better information about a given budget item than would the regulatory agency;
virtually any expenditure could be justified in isolation as being reasonable; and the state may
well have been unwilling to commit enough resources to support a truly effective review process.
Further, the level of micro-management implied by budget review probably would have been
unacceptable in Maine’s political climate. Moreover, the new system was to replace a voluntary
budget review program that supporters of mandatory rate regulation saw as a dismal failure.
These arguments against budget review were compelling at the time and remain so today.
New constraints
The response of the hospital industry to regulation was generally negative, and understandably
so. Prior to the early 1980s, the hospital industry in Maine had been constrained neither by
market forces nor by governmental authority. The voluntary budget review system provided
some appearance of public accountability, but the hospitals were not bound by it. The
introduction of Medicare’s prospective payment system (PPS) in late 1982 was the first
significant cost containment initiative by any major payor to be encountered. PPS hit most of
Maine’s rural hospitals hard and created shortfalls in Medicare revenues that grew markedly over
the years. Still, these hospitals were free to recover lost revenues by cost shifting between
revenue centers and payers in any manner that they saw fit.
The new payment system radically altered the hospitals’ financial environment. First, the
regulatory system makes no provision for profit. A hospital’s allowed net revenues are set equal
only to its financial requirements as defined by the regulatory system. (For the state’s two
proprietary institutions, Jackson Brook Institute and the New England Rehabilitation Hospital of
Portland, a provision is made for a fair return on equity.) The legal and philosophical
justifications for not including profits are sound. Non-profit hospitals can, and often do, generate
profits, in the accounting sense of revenues in excess of expenses, but no human person has the
right to claim a share of these profits; they must be retained by the non-profit corporation.
Further, part of the impetus for creating the regulatory program was a desire to control the level
of profits of nominally non-profit institutions. But profit is seen by hospitals as an important tool
for financing growth. In the new environment, profit could be generated only by cutting expenses
below approved net revenue. This task would require much more active management and much
more vigorous constraints on physician behavior than had been required of administrators ever
before.
Second, hospitals argued from the beginning that, because of its formula-based nature, the
payment system was insensitive to their diversity and complexity. The uniqueness of each
institution was a common refrain from hospital representatives who appeared before the
Commission and before legislative hearings. More specifically, some hospitals had budgeted
generously in their base year while others had not. Some hospitals appeared simply to have been
operating more efficiently in their base years than others. The low-cost, under-budgeted
institutions had a complaint that seemed to them and to sympathetic legislators to be persuasive.
Fundamentally, the new system virtually ensured that hospital revenues would no longer be
adequate to accommodate all of the additional expenses that hospitals might wish to incur. The
payment system ran squarely up against the common hospital desire for growth in the size, in the

scope of services, and in the technological sophistication of the institution. The radical change in
the regulatory environment presented hospitals with the choice between trying to live within the
new constraints or trying to change them. Increasing hospital operating deficits and a broadbased assault on the Commission’s statute and rules indicated that many hospitals chose the latter
path.
The industry reaction
The industry response to regulation was launched on all fronts: public relations, legal, and
political. We will focus on various dimensions of the legal and political response.
The legal challenges to the regulatory structure initially took the form of notices of contest filed
with the Commission by hospitals that were unhappy with the revenue limits proposed by the
executive director. The notice of contest procedure is required by the statute, is defined in the
Commission’s rules, and is shaped by the requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act
(APA). The procedure afforded any aggrieved party an opportunity to make a case to the
Commission staff (in the presence of other affected parties) and ultimately directly to the
Commission. It was clear that some hospital officials had hoped simply to engage in informal
discussions with the staff and the commissioners. To protect the interests of affected parties
uniformly, the Commission insisted on adhering to the formal procedures written into its rules.
Numerous unresolved contest notices led to hearings, Commission deliberations, and court cases.
The hospitals’ unwillingness to accept the application of a set of rules that, in the minds of the
commissioners and their staff, straightforwardly implemented the statute, was an unpleasant
surprise to the system’s designers. The well-defined legal requirements of the adjudicatory
process were, in turn, an unpleasant surprise to many hospitals, especially the smaller ones. The
system came to be viewed as overly legalistic, with some hospital officials complaining that they
could not even begin to approach the Commission without first retaining the services of an
expert attorney.
Notices of contest often raised issues of policy, but the Commission’s ability to address such
issues in the context of adjudicatory proceedings was severely limited. The Commission’s policy
decisions were reflected in its rules, and the rules were constructed -- to ensure evenhandedness - to discourage exceptions. The Commission adhered firmly to the principle that its rules could
not be changed through adjudicatory proceedings but only, in accordance with the APA, through
public hearings at which all potentially affected parties could participate. Since the Commission
was bound by its rules, virtually all of the Commission’s early adjudicatory decisions favored the
executive director rather than the hospital. This contributed to the perception that the
Commission was inflexible, captive to its staff, and biased against the industry.
Some hospitals, unhappy with the Commission’s decisions favoring the executive director,
appealed to the courts. Appeals of Commission decisions went to the state courts which in most
cases found for the Commission, but which in some instances overturned the Commission’s rules
as contrary to the statute. A loosely aligned group of hospitals challenged the constitutionality of
the entire regulatory structure in federal court. Their case was premised on the argument that the
Commission was unlawfully using Medicare savings generated by hospitals under PPS to offset
financial requirements and to reduce charges to other payers. Eventually, the federal courts failed

to find in favor of the hospitals and decided that this was a state, not a federal, issue. Still, the
federal case, when combined with the abundance of other adjudicatory matters facing the
Commission and its staff, exacted a toll.
On a second front, attempts emerged to amend Commission rules through lobbying the staff and
Commissioners and through the formal APA hearing process. The industry pressed the position
that the formula adjustments to financial requirements were inadequate. One of the most
significant controversies related to the adjustment to financial requirements for changes in
patient volume and severity of illness. This adjustment applied a marginal cost factor to account
for increases or decreases from year to year in the number of patients discharged. Such
discharges were adjusted to reflect the relative severity of a particular facility’s patient
population. This adjustment was made prospectively based on the actual case-mix-adjusted
volume experienced two years earlier. Initially, however, no year-end reconciliation to actual
patient volume was incorporated into the volume rule. The hospitals complained about the lack
of sensitivity of the case mix measure used by the Commission (the same index used by
Medicare) to their particular patient populations, about the failure to recognize longer than
average lengths of stay, and about the inadequacy of the marginal cost factors. They also
complained vigorously about the two-year lag built into the rules. The Commission eventually
agreed to implement a year-end reconciliation to actual volume. This adjustment detracted
somewhat from the prospectivity of the system. The concession seemed expedient in light of the
possibility of protracted law-suits over the issue and the potential political costs of not
accommodating hospital concerns.
There were other pressures exerted against the rules. Marked fluctuations in liability and
malpractice insurance rates generated a backlash against the Commission’s inflation adjustment
methodology. Although malpractice coverage comprised, on average, less than one half of one
percent of hospital financial requirements, the issue of increasing insurance costs was raised
often in notices of contest. Eventually, the Commission agreed to change its rules to allow
hospitals to recoup actual changes in liability and malpractice insurance costs. Similarly, the
"nursing shortage," which the industry argued existed during the mid-1980s, precipitated demand
for additional financial requirements to cover all increases in the wages of hospital professional
staff that exceeded the annual inflation adjustment. Recognizing that the legislature would
accommodate the hospitals’ desires, the Commission helped draft the statutory language that
would make such adjustments possible. The Commission did convince the legislature to
incorporate a set of conditions that hospitals would have to meet to qualify for this adjustment.
To qualify, the hospital must demonstrate an "economic hardship," which was defined as an
excess of non-capital operating expenses over non-capital financial requirements. While this
provision ensured that each hospital used its allotted revenues before financial requirements
would be increased, some observers believed that the provision added an incentive to expend all
revenues available.
As noted above, the system included provisions for ad hoc adjustments in financial requirements,
at the Commission’s discretion, to reflect the cost of "unforeseen and uncontrollable events." The
hospitals saw this provision as a loophole through which they attempted to pass various items,
such as the malpractice insurance premium increases discussed above and changes in the cost of
contractual arrangements with physicians. The Commission also saw the provision as a loophole

and, much to the frustration of the hospitals, kept the size of the loophole to a minimum. The
Commission conceded to a limited degree by accommodating such items as the additional
expense of federally-mandated HIV and hepatitis precautions and the additional expense of new
treatments (e.g., the use of tPA in the treatment of heart attacks) or technological innovations that
hospitals could argue convincingly had become standards of practice. However, the Commission
earned a reputation for being reluctant to make such adjustments, and hospital administrators
continued to argue that the system did not accommodate what one hospital official called "subtle
changes" in hospital expenses. The Commission’s position was that such subtle changes could
have been and should have been financed by savings elsewhere in the hospital’s budget.
Hospitals also were displeased with the Commission’s performance in another area: the sizing of
the Hospital Development Account (originally the Certificate of Need Development Account).
The Hospital Development Account places an annual cap on total additions to financial
requirements, across all hospitals, that can be approved through the CON process. The initial
"credits" to the account were established by statute at one percent of expenses approved under
the voluntary budget review program for the first payment year, and one percent of first payment
year financial requirements for the second payment year. Thereafter, the Commission was
responsible for establishing the amount of the credit. Year after year, the size of the credit was a
focus of controversy. The credit for the third year was predicated on an estimate of hospital CON
projects that were expected to be submitted for review during the year. A credit of $6.44 million
for the third year was approved, an increase of five percent relative to the previous year, even
though the increase exceeded projected growth in personal income in Maine, one of the
Commission’s standards of affordability. In the fourth year, the Commission approved a credit to
the development account that was formulated by trending the third year’s credit forward for
projected inflation. The resulting figure fell far short of the $17 million cost of the 38 pending
projects that had been submitted by hospitals for CON approval. The Commission argued that,
even without a credit to the Development Account, hospital charges to private payers would
increase by 14 percent during the fourth year, due to the combined effect of the routine formula
adjustments and the increasing revenue shortfalls created by Medicare and Medicaid. Since
Maine citizens’ income was expected to increase by less than eight percent, the staff and
commissioners contended that even the first dollar expended on any CON project would, by
definition, be unaffordable. Although the Commission expressed a willingness to reconsider the
credit to the account during the year upon the request of the Commissioner of the Department of
Human Services, who was responsible for CON approvals, the Maine Hospital Association made
a direct appeal to the legislature. The legislature subsequently enacted and the governor signed a
bill that added $7.8 million to the Development Account.
The hospitals regularly sought legislative approval for changes in the statute, generally without
Commission support. Some proposals were approved, others were rejected. In one instance, the
Commission joined the hospitals in successfully seeking legislation to permit productivity
adjustments that would reward hospitals that had come into the system with relatively low costs
in comparison to other similar institutions. In another instance, the hospitals sought to eliminate
the CON program. The Commission’s vigorous objections led to several compromise revisions
in that statute. The hospitals’ most ambitious legislative effort occurred in 1986, when the
industry had a bill introduced that would have repealed the entire financing statute. After a 12hour hearing at the Augusta Civic Center, the only venue large enough to accommodate all of the

hospital staff, trustees and patients whose attendance had been encouraged by the industry, the
Joint Committee on Human Resources voted the bill "ought not to pass," and the system
remained essentially intact.
The continuous criticism of the system led ultimately to the establishment, in 1987, of the Blue
Ribbon Commission on Health Care Expenditures. The Blue Ribbon Commission, whose
membership included representatives of the major special interests affected by hospital
regulation and several legislators, provided a forum for the industry’s concerns. Its deliberations
led to legislation that continued the Health Care Finance Commission, but which mandated
several significant changes in the regulatory program, most responsive to the issues discussed
above. The revamped system, according to its advocates, was designed to allow whatever
competitive forces exist within the hospital sector to operate more freely. Thus, there is greater
sensitivity to volume changes in the new system: Most hospitals (except those in the more
isolated areas of the state) are compensated for the impact of increases or decreases in patient
volume in the year in which the change occurs. This change responds to the interests of growing
institutions, and, indeed, rewards growth, while it reduces the negative impact of volume
changes on small, rural hospitals. Capital costs now are essentially passed through to financial
requirements, with capital expenses based on depreciation and interest rather than principal and
interest. Although the contentious "unforeseen events" provision of the statute was repealed, a
"variable adjustment factor" was introduced, requiring an annual add-on to financial
requirements for changes in technology, medical practice, and unmeasurable shifts in severity of
illness. This provision responds to the industry argument that the original statute and the
Commission’s rules were inadequately responsive to "subtle changes" in hospital costs.
Provision was also made for a "standard component" that adjusts financial requirements to
compensate for variations in cost per case among hospitals within peer groups. Finally, a pool for
subsidizing bad debts, charity care, and governmental shortfalls was established to relieve these
upward pressures on charges. The pool, funded out of the state’s general revenues, received an
appropriation in its first two years. State budget crises in later years precluded the appropriation
of any new monies.
Impact on the commission
As a consequence of the industry’s negative response to the regulatory system, the Commission
was continually embroiled in time-consuming and distracting conflicts. (Hospital administrators
doubtless would make the same claim.) While the Commission largely ignored the public
relations challenges mounted by the hospitals, perhaps to its own detriment, it could not ignore
challenges either through its own processes, through the courts, or in the legislature. The staff
became mired in the details of notices of contest. The commissioners listened to oral arguments,
waded through briefs and hearings records, and deliberated for hours at a stretch. Each spring
found the executive director and general counsel defending the Commission’s positions at
legislative committee hearings and work sessions. With increasing frequency, the general
counsel appeared in court.
The Commission did not overtly devise a strategy for addressing its problems. Yet an implicit
strategy developed. The inclination was to protect the integrity of the payment system in light of
its principal goal of cost containment. In practice, this meant fending off any initiative that would

unduly raise financial requirements. The staff responded to notices of contest with firmness and
rigor. The Commission stuck firmly with the rules, almost always supporting the interpretations
of the executive director. Adherence to the requirements of the APA was religious. Before the
legislature, the Commission’s representatives took pains to explain as clearly as possible the
implications of all proposed legislation. Pressed for time and disinclined philosophically to
engage in public relations activity, the Commission limited its defense to occasional speeches by
the executive director and commissioners before hospital groups and other directly interested
forums.
As the number of formal cases filed with the Commission proliferated, a kind of de facto budget
review process developed, which coexisted with the formula-based system and was administered
by the same staff. Aside from the sheer burden of many formal cases, the staff lacked what
would have been a key element in a formal budget review system: the option of reviewing and
rejecting those portions of a hospital’s budget not under contest. The adjustments sought by
hospitals were always for higher financial requirements, so any settlement would increase
hospital revenues, regardless of how inefficient the institution otherwise might be. The staff’s
reluctance to settle was understandable. These considerations, along with the press of other
business, generated a large backlog of cases that, in turn, became a liability for the Commission.
The long list of outstanding cases, which only recently have nearly all come to settlement,
afforded the hospitals the argument that the system was needlessly complex and difficult to
administer.
The enormous case load tested the internal structure of the Commission. For purposes of
adjudicating cases, the Commission’s staff had been divided into two components: the hearing
examiner and staff (consisting of an attorney and one or more advisory staff), and the executive
director and legal counsel and staff. Informal communication (i.e., communication in the absence
of all of the parties to the case) between the examiner’s group and the advocacy group on issues
directly related to a formal case was forbidden. This approach, while probably the only
acceptable course of action, had its costs. Insights into the practical workings of the payment
system, learned on the legal side in the course of an on-going case, could not be transferred
readily to the policy side, and vice versa. These difficulties may have weakened the
administration of the system.
An imbalance of forces
In the political arena, a number of factors, most not unique to Maine, but in some cases
exaggerated in Maine’s economic and political climate, weighed heavily in the hospitals’ favor.
A growing economy. The adverse political climate facing the Commission may have been
worsened because it was attempting to restrain hospital revenues in the context of a growing
economy. Pressure on the state budget moderated substantially during the mid- to late-1980s as
rapid economic growth generated new tax revenues. The initial motivation to control the growth
in Medicaid costs was mitigated. The blossoming economy did not provide a political climate of
support for regulation. If everything else was growing during the Commission’s early years, why
should not hospitals share in the growth? The addition of $7.8 million by the legislature to the
Hospital Development Account seemed symptomatic of this kind of thinking.

Citizen legislature. The statute creating the Commission was approved overwhelmingly by both
houses of the legislature. Despite the continued support of key Human Resources Committee
members, the consistent opposition of the hospitals began eventually to take their toll on the
Human Resources Committee’s patience. The complexity of the regulatory system made it
difficult to explain and defend. For instance, when hospitals would argue that they were
increasingly experiencing operating losses, the Commission would have to explain that in many
instances total margins were still positive and that accounting losses did not accurately reflect
cash flows. While Committee members understood the issues, the necessity of long and
convoluted explanations was troublesome as the issues resurfaced from session to session.
Contributing to these problems, the rate setting statute failed to set any standards by which the
success of the system might be measured. Statutory intent was clear enough, but there was no
yardstick to gauge effectiveness. The Human Resources Committee became impatient with the
hospitals as well as with the Commission. Some Committee members expressed the hope that
some basic changes in the system could "fix" it well enough that the Committee could attend to
business other than hospital regulation. In this vein, the Committee endorsed the idea of a Blue
Ribbon Commission to evaluate the regulatory program and to propose "reforms" in the system.
Special interests and the public interest. The beneficiaries of effective regulation are the state’s
citizens and their employers, who would pay lower taxes and health insurance premiums. The
individual citizen, however, has little incentive to participate in the political process. The cost of
becoming adequately informed about the complex issues of hospital finance and the cost of
participating in a citizen lobbying effort could easily outweigh the benefits that a citizen might
reasonably expect to follow from his or her own action. The potentially concerned citizen has
incentives to be a "free rider" who lets others bear the cost of political activism. The authors can
recall, with perhaps a single exception, no Commission hearing or discussion session and no
legislative hearing or work session at which a citizen was evidently present without the
sponsorship of one special interest or another.
Moreover, the savings generated from cost containment are largely invisible. Cost containment
of the modest sort pursued in Maine limits the growth in costs rather than lowering them. It is
difficult to persuade voters by the argument that costs, although rising, are lower than they
otherwise would have been. And increases in hospital revenues attributable to legislated
increases in financial requirements do not have the same immediacy as tax increases. While
legislators might well have been uncomfortable raising $7.8 million in taxes to finance hospital
expansion, they seemed to have few qualms about raising financial requirements by the same
amount.
The Commission did have organized supporters. Among its early allies were Blue Cross/Blue
Shield of Maine and the health insurance industry lobby. Just prior to the creation of the
Commission, Blue Cross and the hospitals had failed to agree to continue their long-standing
contractual relationships, which had been built on a negotiated differential that gave Blue Cross a
very favorable position in the market. Blue Cross may have seen the regulatory program not only
as a way of relieving pressure on premiums by controlling costs, but also as a means of
continuing its discount through regulation. But the differential ultimately approved by the
Commission was only a fraction of that which Blue Cross commanded prior to the creation of the
payment system. Thereafter, the Blue Cross commitment to the Commission’s program, though

always present, appeared to be somewhat lukewarm. UNUM (at the time, Union Mutual) was
initially an active supporter of regulation, but lost interest when it left the health insurance
market. The Commission’s supporters also included elements of the low-income lobby (often in
the form of Consumers for Affordable Healthcare), the labor lobby (in the form of the Maine
AFL-CIO’s Maine Labor Group on Health) and representatives of the elderly (the Maine
Committee on Aging).
On the other side of the conflict was the organized political force of the hospital industry. The
Maine Hospital Association served as the industry’s principal lobbyist and organizer of
opposition, and it eventually enlisted the organized support of hospital trustees. The Commission
was initially able to garner some support from the small, rural hospitals which were being
particularly hard-hit by a growing Medicare shortfall, by decreasing admissions, and by
increasing competition from the regional medical centers (and in some instances from among
themselves). The Commission argued with some success that its program favored these troubled
institutions, since no downward volume adjustment was made during the first two payment years
and since the formula determining revenue limits ensured coverage of financial requirements
despite Medicare shortfalls. But despite their numbers, the small hospitals were not a sufficiently
powerful force with-in the industry to sway the hospital association’s position. And as time
passed, regulatory benefits for small hospitals diminished. As the Commission began to
implement annual volume adjustments, small institutions found themselves without the
flexibility to make the needed reductions in expenses in response to lower approved revenues.
Further, some small hospitals faced market circumstances that were so adverse that they simply
could not levy charges as high as those authorized by the Commission. Thus, a support source
from within the industry was eventually lost.
In Maine, a hospital rate regulation program may be particularly vulnerable to political attack
because of the underdeveloped nature of the state’s rural economy. Many hospitals, indeed, even
those in Maine’s major cities, are the largest employers in their communities. They are an export
industry that creates employment in response to demand from outside the community. Some
supplies and many services are purchase locally, which pumps money into the local economy.
Politically influential local business people thus have a financial stake in the viability of the local
hospital. The traditional philanthropic orientation of a community towards its hospital and the
value that people place on the ready availability of hospital services both buttress this concern.
The hospital industry contrasts sharply with public utilities, such as electric power companies,
whose resources are concentrated in only a few locations. The utilities do not have support
groups such as local trustees and "auxilians" scattered throughout the state’s electoral districts.
Lack of gubernatorial support. The Commission was created at the initiative of and with the
vigorous support of then Governor Joseph Brennan and the leadership of the Department of
Human Services. Continued support was not forthcoming from the new administration. Governor
McKernan and his Human Services Commissioner both seemed disposed against regulation. The
Commission would have preferred to size the Hospital Development Account in the context of a
state health plan, but the Department of Human Services curtailed the planning process. The
Commission also would have welcomed the support of the Department for its efforts to constrain
the sizing of the Development Account by reference to the standard of affordability.

Ambivalent business interests. The weakness of political support for hospital regulation in
Augusta was exacerbated by the lack of support for that regulation by the state’s business
community. The organized business community always displayed an ambivalent stance toward
the regulatory program. In other states that took a firm stand on hospital cost containment, such
as Massachusetts and Maryland, powerful business/labor coalitions supported health care reform.
Maine had no such group. Business leaders recognized that high health care costs might be a
deterrent to new industry or a threat to their competitive positions. They were obviously aware of
the rapid increase in group insurance rates. On the other hand, business leaders often serve on
hospital boards and are naturally skeptical about regulation. This ambivalence apparently
precluded the possibility of strong support for the Commission. As the Blue Ribbon Committee
deliberations developed, business representatives generally supported the hospitals.
Other factors. Several other considerations contributed to a less than supportive political
environment. Maine may have lacked circumstances that in others states made rate regulation
more politically viable. In Maryland, whose regulatory system served in part as a model for
Maine’s (although there are important differences), large, urban hospitals were facing financial
difficulties which would be mitigated as the state required payers to pay rates sufficient to cover
each institution’s financial requirements. The Maryland system was created with the support of
these hospitals. The Maryland rationale was simply irrelevant to Maine’s larger, urban
institutions which, for the most part, entered the system during a period of prosperity and growth.
Further, in contrast to Maryland, Maine implemented its regulatory system at a time when the
state was not alarmingly above national averages in terms of per capita hospital expenditures.
The Commission has argued that per capita comparisons are misleading because they ignore
Maine’s low income and that affordability is really the central issue.
Finally, because Medicare implemented PPS at roughly the same time that Maine created the
Commission, the credibility of the new payment system may have been weakened. Pursuit of a
federal waiver of Medicare payment regulations would have been so obviously fruitless that the
payment system never covered all payers, as was originally intended. Medicare’s failure to cover
its portion of rising financial requirements led to increases in charges to the non-governmental
payers that far exceeded increases in costs, which created the appearance that the system was
ineffective in controlling the growth in insurance premiums regardless of its ability to control
costs.
Reprise and prospective
The success of a new regulatory program depends as much on its political feasibility as its
technical merit. Technical soundness is essential for a program’s success, but it is not sufficient
to ensure its viability. On the other hand, a regulatory program may be politically viable even if
it is technically ineffective: It will simply not engender any industry opposition. The key
question, then, is this: When can a technically effective regulatory program be politically viable?
There are two possibilities: Either the program has sufficient countervailing support to withstand
attack from the regulated industry, or the industry agrees, at least tacitly, to accept regulation. As
regulatory economist Alfred Kahn has observed, the latter situation can arise when an industry
sees some compensating gain from the existence of the regulatory program. (Testimony in Maine
Public Utilities Commission Central Maine Power Company Docket N. 84-120.)

The evolving political and economic environment in which the Commission and the hospital
industry function may justify and assure the Commission’s continued existence, perhaps in
modified form, for both reasons. First, despite the criticism the Commission has endured over the
years, it has managed to survive and to accumulate a credible record of cost containment. As
indicated in its most recent annual report, hospital charges, hospital charges per capita, net
patient service revenue, and net patient service revenue per capita all have risen in Maine over
the period 1984-91 at rates far less than regional and national averages. The Commission
estimates that "...if Maine hospitals had experienced increases in their net patient service revenue
equal to those of the United States for the period from 1984 through 1991, instead of the
increases allowed under Maine’s hospital payment system, they would have collected an
additional $168.7 million over the period." (Maine Health Care Finance Commission, Annual
Report, 1992.) At least for the period covered by these data, it would appear that the forces that
may have eroded its power have not rendered it completely ineffective in containing costs. The
Commission’s continued existence, despite substantial political opposition, probably reflects a
fundamental acknowledgement by the public at large and by the legislature that the problems of
rising health care costs and inaccessibility to health care services simply cannot be solved
without public intervention. With the attention currently focused on health care reform by the
Clinton administration and by the press, this climate is likely to continue.
Secondly, the accumulated expertise of the Commission, including the staff’s knowledge of the
industry and its data base, are a logical core for any new state effort to expand access while
containing the growth in costs. A state-level single-payer system could be built on the foundation
that the Commission has already established. Alternatively, if the Clinton administration moves
as anticipated to give states latitude in establishing programs built on the managed competition,
the Commission could also serve a useful role. Maine is too small to support more than one
buyer cooperative and that cooperative might well be a state agency. In this case, managed
competition and the single-payer concept meld together. Again, the Commission would be the
logical starting point if the state were to consolidate the planning, purchasing, and rate control
functions into a single agency. In any case, the effectiveness of any new state-run program for
expanding access and restraining costs would be challenged by the same forces that have
challenged the Commission. For such a system to be viable, it must have the vigorous support of
the legislature and the governor.
By an alternative line of reasoning, the hospital industry in Maine might come to accept rate
regulation as serving at least some of its interests. Mandatory rate regulation was viewed with
particular disdain during the 1980s, when conservative attitudes toward government prevailed
and when the hospital industry argued that competition could solve the cost problem. (Indeed,
the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Commission, which have only recently been fully
implemented, were based on this assertion.) Competition is now out of vogue, and has been
replaced with a new ethos of "cooperation" among providers. But cooperation among suppliers
in any industry is justifiably suspect, since it poses the threat of price fixing and market sharing.
State and federal anti-trust laws respond to these concerns, but recently health care providers
have been seeking and receiving limited exceptions from these statutes. Such exceptions might
be justified if rates are regulated to protect the public from anti-competitive pricing policies. In
exchange for providing hospitals more flexibility in pursuing cooperative development
strategies, the public reasonably deserves two things: effective rate regulation and appropriate

constraints on the rate of expansion of hospital services and plant and equipment. Maine’s
current regulatory program is well suited to engineer this reciprocity. If the hospital industry and
political actors both understand the Maine regulatory program in these terms, then the program
may yet become an accepted and effective political-economic institution.
Some lessons
It is widely agreed that there is no guarantee that the hospital industry, when left on its own, will
operate in the public interest by providing the right amount of services in the most efficient
manner possible. Problems arise largely because consumers of hospital services are not informed
buyers of hospital services. Doctors act as their agents, and hospital services are paid for
overwhelmingly by third parties. Institutions such as the Commission are meant to compensate
for the market’s failures. Effective rate regulation would assure that the right amount of
resources flow into the industry and that suppliers do not earn excessive profit. Thus, agencies
such as the Commission are really an alternative means of making important social choices than
cannot be left to the market. The weakness of such agencies is their vulnerability to political
influence. We have seen that vulnerability in Maine’s experience with hospital rate regulation.
Based on Maine’s experience, we offer the following observations:
•

•

•

Simplicity may be an important virtue. Complexity itself is a political liability.
Regardless of the technical merit of a program, if it is not readily explainable to the
public and to the legislator, or even to hospital administrators, it will be suspect.
Simplicity will lower administrative and compliance costs and may also reduce the costs
of adjudication.
There needs to be an acceptance by the agency and by the political system of a few clearcut and readily understandable standards of agency effectiveness. Establishing standards
at the outset is a risky step for an agency to take. But if the agency succeeds by these
standards, it will be better able to defend its performance.
Third, a negative response from the regulated industry should be expected, and the
agency should be prepared to defend its position in the political arena. To defend itself
against the political response of an offended industry, the regulatory agency must be
willing to nurture the agency’s constituency by keeping its political sponsors and
supportive interest groups well informed and by mounting an effective public information
program. Program simplicity and well-defined performance standards would aid in these
efforts.

Above all, if economic regulation of hospitals, and health care providers for that matter, is to
work for Maine citizens, elected officials need to be willing to act as buffers between interest
groups and the regulators. Effective regulation will nearly always offend the regulated industry;
opposition should surprise no one. Supporters of regulation need to be prepared for a protracted
defense of the regulatory agency. Absent an effective defense, the danger is that the regulatory
program may end up serving the interests only of the regulated industry or acting as a smoke
screen for economically inefficient industry performance.
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